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Appellants Cynthia M. Lloyd and Dennis S. Lloyd submit their reply brief in this matter as 
follows. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN EXTENDING THE SALES PERIOD SINCE THERE 
WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH AN EXTENSION WOULD LIKELY RESULT IN THE 
SALE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR NOT LESS THAN $9.50 PER SQUARE/FOOT. 
Under the Stipulation and Agreement for Court Supervised Sales of Real Property, among 
Maurine J. Lloyd, Cynthia M. Lloyd, Dennis Lloyd, SusanL. Martinez and Richard Martinez (the 
"Stipulation"), certain properties (the "Subject Property") were listed for sale with Ralph Reidell of 
Coldwell Bankers "for six (6) months for sale at the highest price possible, [but] no less than 
$9.50/square foot." Stipulation at ^ | 3. (R. 401.) The Stipulation authorized the trial court to extend 
the sales period for an additional six (6) months if "the Court [was] persuaded that an additional six 
(6) months sales period [would] likely result in the sale of the Subject Property [for not less than 
$9.50 per square/foot.]" Id at t 7. (R.402.) 
At a May 19, 2008 scheduling conference - over four months after the initial listing 
agreement had expired on January 10, 2008 - plaintiffs counsel made an oral motion to extend the 
sales period six months. Defendants' counsel requested that plaintiffs counsel file that motion in 
writing, but the trial court declined to grant that request. No written motion was ever filed. 
Defendants' counsel filed a written opposition to that oral motion, and the trial court granted 
plaintiffs oral motion. Because plaintiff failed to present any evidence at the time that oral motion 
was made (or otherwise) that a six month extension would "likely result in a sale of the Subject 
Property" at not less than $9.50 per square foot, this Court should reverse the Order granting that 
motion. 
Plaintiff argues that the Stipulation "only required that the court be persuaded that an 
extension would likely result in a sale," not necessarily a sale at $9.50 a square foot. That is not 
correct. Although the section of the Stipulation that states that "the sales period may be extended 
for an additional six (6) months" if "the Court is persuaded that an additional six (6) month period 
will likely result in the sale of the Subject Property" does not expressly include the $9.50 per square 
foot minimum, other sections in the Stipulation make it clear that any sale of the Subject Property 
must be for not less than $9.50 a square foot - both before and after any extension. For example, the 
Stipulation provides that the listing agent is to "market the Subject Property for sale at the highest 
possible sale price, no less than $9.50/square foot" - without limiting that minimum sales price to 
the initial listing period. Id. at f 3. (Emphasis added.)1 
To obtain a six month extension, the moving party must "persuade" the trial court that an 
Similarly, the Stipulation provided that "[i]f escrow is not opened for sale of the Subject 
Property within six (6) months of the date of the courts order [July 10, 2007] in an amount of not 
less than $9.50 per square foot" then the stay on the state court litigation would be lifted and the 
matter would proceed. Id. at f^ 7. R. 402.) (Emphasis added.) 
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"additional six (6) months would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property." If the $9.50 per 
square foot minimum sales price did not also apply to the extension period there would be no need 
to "persuade" the trial court, since the Subject Property would obviously sell within an "additional 
six (6) months" if the price was low enough. The Subject Property was not to be sold at any price, 
no matter how low. The Stipulation is clear that the Subject Property must sell for at least $9.50 per 
square foot - irrespective of whether the Subject Property sells during the initial listing period or 
during any extension that may be granted. 
Plaintiff next alleges that the trial court relied on five "factors" in granting her oral motion 
to extend the sales period six months. None of those "five factors" were relevant to the criteria for 
extending the deadline - that the court had to be persuaded the Subject Property would likely sell for 
not less than $9.50 a square foot if the sales period was extended six (6) months. 
a. The Subject Property had previously been under contract. Plaintiff claims that one of the 
grounds for extending the sales period six months was that the Subject Property "had previously 
been under contract." Appellee's Brief at 11. At the May 19,2008 scheduling conference, plaintiffs 
counsel represented that the Subject Property had been under contract, but that she didn't "know 
what happened" and didn't know "why [the sale] fell through:" 
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Ms. Crocker: We did actually have the property under contract last 
fall and it went through two due diligence period. One was extended 
and I don't know what happened, why it fell through. 
R. 727. 
There is nothing about the Subject Property previously being under contract that is probative of 
whether extending the sales period an additional six months would likely result in a sale of the 
Subject Property for not less than $9.50 per square foot," especially where counsel acknowledged 
that she "didn't know what happened" or "why the sale fell through." 
b. Listing agent had withdrawn his services. In her brief, plaintiff makes numerous claims 
that Ralph Reidell "withdrew" as the listing agent. The only basis in the record to support this claim 
is a statement made by plaintiffs counsel at the May 19, 2008 status conference wherein she said 
that even though she "hadn't been able to talk to [Ralph Reidell] personally," she "understood" that 
Mr. Reidell was "unable to finish up:" 
We did have a listing agent, Ralph Reidell. It's my understanding -
and I haven't been able to talk to him personally - but its my 
understanding that he had difficulty working with the defendants and 
was unable to finish up. 
R. 727 (Emphasis added.) 
That statement is speculation, has no foundation and is hearsay. There was no affidavit, letter or 
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document of any kind from Ralph Reidell (or otherwise) indicating that Mr. Reidell wouldn't be 
willing to relist the Subject Property. Plaintiff claims that "defendants admit that the realtor 
resigned" - a false statement. Plaintiff claims that "[t]he parties could not agree on a replacement 
and the appointment was required to accomplish the stated goals in the stipulation" - a false 
statement. There was never a discussion with defendants as to a replacement for Ralph Reidell as 
the listing agent. The first time defendants were aware that plaintiff wanted to replace Ralph Reidell 
as the listing agent is when plaintiff submitted a form of Order to the trial court that substituted 
"Equity Real Estate" as the listing agent. Plaintiff claims that "the trial court was also presented with 
information that a new realtor was going to list the property" - again a false statement. The trial 
court was never "presented with any information that a new realtor was going to list the property." 
A new realtor simply showed up for the first time in plaintiffs form of Order. 
In any event, whether Mr. Reidell would agree to relist the Subject Property has no relevance 
to whether the Subject Property is "likely" to sell at $9.50 a square foot if there is a six (6) month 
extension. 
c. That the defendants were not cooperating in the listing or sale of the Subject Property. 
In her brief, plaintiff makes repeated claims of "interferences" by defendant. The only basis 
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in the record to support that claim is a statement made by plaintiffs counsel at the May 19, 2008 
status conference that even though she "hadn't been able to talk to [Ralph Reidell] personally" she 
"understood" that "[Ralph Reidell] had difficulty working with the defendants:" (R. 727.) 
We did have a listing agent, Ralph Reidell. It's my understanding -
and I haven't been able to talk to him personally - but its my 
understanding that he had difficulty working with the defendants and 
was unable to finish up. 
R. 727 (Emphasis added.) 
Again, this statement is speculative, has no foundation, and is based on hearsay. There was no 
affidavit, letter or document of any kind evidencing any such "interference." Furthermore, where 
one party claims that the other party has "refused to cooperate," the Stipulation specifically provides 
a procedure for dealing with such a claim, including an "evidentiary hearing" to determine whether 
the allegation is justified: 
In the event that any party to this Stipulation fails, refuses to 
cooperate, fails to perform in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement to Sell Real Property or otherwise acts as an impediment 
to the sale of the Subject Property, the non-defaulting party shall have 
the right to seek a Court order ordering the sale of the Subject 
Property in accordance with a proffered offer to purchase as presented 
by the Listing Agent. The parties hereto shall have the right to an 
evidentiary hearing in which the court shall receive evidence, 
testimony and argument as to why a particular sale should or should 
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not be ordered. Upon conclusion of the hearing the Court may issue 
its order as the Court determines to be just and proper and the parties 
herein agree to be bound by any such order and waive the right to 
trial, appeal or further proceedings regarding the sale of the Subject 
Property. 
Stipulation, U 8. (R. 420.) 
In this case, it is undisputed that no evidentiary hearing was held - which would have been required 
under the Stipulation if such an allegation had been made. Even if evidence of interference had been 
presented, "interference" is not probative of whether the Subject Property will likely sell at not less 
than $9.50 square foot if a six month extension is granted. 
d. The opportunity for the sale of the property still existed. Plaintiff next claims that "the 
opportunity for the sale of the property still existed." Obviously, the opportunity to sell the Subject 
Property "still existed" at some price. However, the Stipulation required that the opportunity for the 
sale of the Subject Property must "still exist" at not less than $9.50 per square foot. There is nothing 
about the existence of the "opportunity for the sale of the property" alone that supports a finding that 
the six month extension would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property at not less than $9.50 
a square foot. 
e. Summer was approaching and it would be a good time to get the Property back on the 
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market. Finally, plaintiff claims that "summer was approaching and it would be a good time to get 
the Property back on the market." There was no evidence before the trial court that the summer of 
2008 was a "good time" to "get the Property back on the market." The mere fact that summer was 
approaching was not, alone, evidence that the Subject Property was likely to sell for not less than 
$9.50 per square foot during the summer. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the real 
estate market in the Salt Lake area was (and still is) seriously depressed during the summer of 2008. 
Plaintiff attaches as Exhibit D to her brief a "listing packet" by Equity Real Estate (the 
"Listing Packet") that was never made part of the record below. Even so, the Listing Packet only 
supports defendants' position that there was no factual basis for the trial court to find that a six 
month extension would likely result in the sale of the Subject Property for not less that $9.50 per 
square foot. The Listing Packet states that the Subject Property "will probably sell between $8.50 
and $9.00 per square foot. This is due to the market cycle." Appellee's Brief, Exhibit D. 
Accordingly, even considering the Listing Package presented by plaintiff - which states that the 
Subject Property "will probably sell between $8.50 and $9.00 per square foot" - it is clear that there 
was no evidence before the trial court to support a finding that if the listing period was extended for 
six months the Property would likely sell for not less than $9.50 per square foot. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE STIPULATION TO 
MAKE OTHER CHANGES TO THE MANNER OF SALE. 
A. The Trial Court Errored in Changing The Listing Agent to Equity Real Estate. 
As discussed in Appellants' Brief, the Stipulation provided that Ralph Reidell was to be the 
listing agent. Appellants' Brief, pg. 5. At the May 19, 2008 scheduling conference, Ms. Crocker 
said that she "understood" that Ralph Reidell had "been unable to finish," but stated that she had not 
spoken to Mr. Reidell. There was no evidence that Ralph Reidell was not willing to relist the 
Subject Property. Plaintiffs representations regarding the need to replace the listing agent had no 
basis in the record. In any event, Stipulation did not give the trial court authority to change the 
listing agent, absent defendants' consent. 
B. The Court Did Not Have Authority to Eliminate the $9.50 Per Square Foot Minimum. 
Plaintiff claims that a $9.50 per square foot sales price minimum was not required during any 
six month extension. As previously discussed, the $9.50 per square foot minimum sale price 
continued during any extension. The Stipulation did not give the trial court authority to eliminate 
the $9.50 per square foot minimum sales price, absent defendants' consent. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Have Authority to Extend the Sales Period Past July 10, 2008. 
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Plaintiff claims that the Court did not "abuse its discretion" in extending the sales period past 
July 10,2008 since defendants "interfered" with the sale and marketing of the Subject Property and 
defendants counsel was "unavailable" for a lengthy period of time. 
Even assuming that defendants interfered with the marketing of the Subject Property or that 
counsel was unavailable for a lengthy period of time - neither of which are true - under the terms of 
the Stipulation, the Court did not have discretion to extend the sales period past July 10,2008. The 
stipulation provided that the "the sales period [from July 10, 2007 to January 10, 2008] may be 
extended six months." Stipulation, f 7. R. 402.) "If the sale of the Subject Property is not 
concluded within six (6) months or a year as the case may be" the Stipulation was void. Id R. 402. 
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the Stipulation clearly identified a "one year" limit on the sales 
period for the Subject Property - which was July 10, 2008. 
As previously discussed, defendants did not interfere with the sale or marketing of the 
Subject Property and there is nothing in the record indicating that they did. At the May 19, 2008 
scheduling conference, Ms. Crocker stated that she "understood" that Mr. Reidell had difficulty 
working with defendants, but acknowledged that she had not spoken to Mr. Reidell. Furthermore, 
where one party "fails to cooperate" in the marketing or sale of the Subject Property, the Stipulation 
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provides for a specific procedure - including an evidentiary hearing - for resolving that issue. In this 
case, that procedure was never invoked. In short, there is no basis for any claim of interference. 
Plaintiffs representation that counsel for defendants was "unavailable from October 2007 
to April 2008" is also a blatant misrepresentation. Appellee's Brief at 15. On October 4, 2007 
defendants' counsel at the time - Nelson J. Warner - filed a "Notice of Unavailability of Counsel" 
advising the Court and opposing party that he would be unavailable for two and one-half weeks -
from October 5,2007 through October 22,2007. R. 435-436. On February 4,2008, a Substitution 
of Counsel was filed substituting Russell A. Cline for Nelson Werner as counsel for defendants. (R. 
438.) Plaintiff has provided no explanation as to how Mr. Warner's unavailability for 2 14 weeks 
effected Mr. Reidell's efforts to market the Subject Property during that period. Mr. Warner's 
unavailability from October 5,2007 through October 22,2007 is not an unavailability "from October 
2007 to April 2008," as plaintiff claims. 
If plaintiff believed that there were claims of "interference" or "unavailability" that justified 
an extension, those claims should have been made in November 2007 or December 2007, so as 
to extend the sale period within the limits of the Stipulation - from January 10, 2008 through July 
10,200 8. Plaintiff alio wed the listing to expire on January 10,2008, and said nothing until the status 
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conference requested by defendants over four months later - on May 19, 2008. These claims were 
unfounded, untimely and under the Stipulation did not provide the trial court with authority to extend 
the sales period past July 10, 2008. 
III. THE COURT ERRORED IN MAKING THE OTHER CHANGES 
Even if the trial court did have authority to make the three changes discussed above, the trial 
court errored in making those changes since none of them were requested in plaintiffs motion and 
there was no factual basis supporting those changes. 
A. None of the changes were requested in plaintiffs motion. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that her May 19, 2008 oral motion did not include a motion to 
change the real estate agent, eliminate the $9.50 per square foot minimum or change the period of 
any extension to other than January 10, 2008 to July 10, 2008. R. 725-732. These changes simply 
"showed up" in the form of Order that plaintiff provided to the court after her motion had been 
granted. 
B. There was no factual basis supporting those changes. 
As previously discussed, there is no evidentiary basis for plaintiffs claim that Mr. Reidell 
would not relist the Property, and needed to be replaced. Plaintiff claims that "[information 
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regarding Equity Real Estate and the plaintiffs proposed listing agent was supplied to the 
defendants...and [defendants] never made any attempt to suggest another realtor." Appellee Brief, 
pg. 1. The new listing agent first appeared in plaintiffs proposed form of Order. In its Objection 
to Form of Order, defendants requested that the sentence "The Property should be immediately listed 
for sale with Equity Real Estate" be stricken from the form of Order. R. 592. At the October 28, 
2008 hearing on that Objection to Form of Order, defendants specifically objected to changing agents 
from the listing agent agreed upon in the Stipulation: 
Mr. Cline: The other problem is that under the agreement, the 
stipulated real estate agent was Ralph Reidell of Caldwell Bankers, 
and when Ms. Crock...said that the property shall be immediately 
listed with Equity Real Estate...[that] was the first time we ever heard 
[of this and that] would be a material change in what the parties 
agreed to. 
R. 736. 
The email from Dovey Roah of Equity Real Estate attached as Exhibit C to Appellee's Brief is not 
part of the record below and, in any event, is hearsay.2 
As to extending the sales period beyond the one year limit, even if the Court did have 
discretion under the Stipulation to grant an extension beyond July 10,2008 (which it did not), there 
2None of the exhibits attached to Appellee's Brief were part of the record below. 
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was no evidence supporting such an additional extension. The listing expired January 10,2008, and 
plaintiff for the first time moved for a six month extension (from January 10,2008 to July 10,2008) 
at the May 19, 2008 scheduling conference. The issue of when the six-month extension begins and 
ends was first discussed before the trial court at the October 28, 2008 hearing on the Objection to 
Form of Order. At that hearing the Court stated that if a motion to extend is made during the 
extension period, it "doesn't make sense" for the time to be running while you are waiting for the 
trial court to rule: 
If [the Subject Property] hasn't been listed and they're waiting for the 
Court to make a decision...[it] doesn't make much sense to say...it 
should have been listed from January to June and now its August so 
you're time as listed is already running even though the Court did 
have a hearing [or issue] an order until after the time was up. 
R. 735-36. 
In making that statement, the trial court ignored the fact that the maximum listing period authorized 
under the Stipulation was one year (until July 10, 2008.) The trial court also ignored the fact that, 
if plaintiff wanted to extend the listing agreement (which expired January 10, 2008) an additional 
six-months and wanted the benefit of the full six months listing period, it was her responsibility to 
file in November or December 2007 - so as to have the issue decided at or about the time the initial 
14 
listing period expired. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order should be vacated and defendants should 
be awarded their costs and attorney's fees. 
Dated this H day of May, 2009. 
/ / L 
RUSSELL A. CLINE, attorney for Defendants 
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